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Crumbling of the
Wills Act.
Australians
Point the Way
South Australia's substantial compliance statute
may be the death blow to strict compliance
with wills act formalities.
By John H. Langhein
ON NOVEMBER 29, 1978, a probate court
sitting in Adelaide, South Australia, is-
sued a judgment that is likely to stand
as a great milestone in the progress of
probate law in the United States and
the common law world.
The Australian court admitted to
probate, and thereby enforced, a will
that was conceded to have been exe-
cuted in partial violation of the formal
requirements of the local wills act. For
the first time a common law court ex-
cused a testator's failure to comply
strictly with the wills act formalities. A
"substantial compliance" or "harmless
error" doctrine had finally been recog-
nized and applied.
Every Anglo-American jurisdiction
has a so-called wills act that prescribes
the formalities for making a valid will.
These statutes have a common core that
traces back to English models-the
wills provisions of the Statute of Frauds
of 1677 and the Wills Act of 1837. This
received English tradition recognizes
only one mode of testation-the at-
tested (sometimes called the formal or
witnessed) will. Its essentials are writ-
ing, signature, and attestation. The
terms of the will must be in writing, the
testator must sign it, and two (some-
times three) witnesses must attest the
testator's signature. A variety of other
formal requirements can be found in
the wills acts of various jurisdictions:
rules governing thq/acknowledgment of
a signature already in place, rules call-
ing for the testator and the witnesses to
sign in each other's presence, require-
ments about the positioning of signa-
ture, and many more. (For a fairly re-
cent compilation of the details, see Rees,
"American Wills Statutes," 46 Virginia
Law Review 613, 856 (1960).)
An alternative formal system for so-
called holographic (handwritten) wills
is permitted to testators in twenty-odd
American jurisdictions, mostly those in
the Western states where Spanish law
has been influential, but including
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and now
(through the medium of the newly
enacted Uniform Probate Code) Michi-
gan. Holograph statutes allow the tes-
tator in effect to substitute handwriting
for attestation. He may execute his will
without witnesses, but it must be "en-
tirely" (or in some states "materially")
in his handwriting.
These formal requirements are not
difficult to comply with, and one of the
basic responsibilities of conscientious
lawyer-draftsmen is to supervise execu-
tion ceremonies in order to ensure
compliance. In general, the bar dis-
charges this responsibility well, so that
execution blunders rarely happen in
the lawyer-served end of the estate
planning spectrum. Not so for home-
drawn wills, however. Laymen ignor-
ant of the existence or true import of
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statutory requirements have left behind
them a staggering legacy of noncom-
plying instruments, frustrated estate
plans, aggravated probate expenses,
and commensurate human misery.
In dealing with these botched wills,
Anglo-American courts have produced
one of the cruelest chapters that sur-
vives in the common law. Purely tech-
nical violations that could in no way
cast doubt on the authenticity or final-
ity of wills are held to invalidate the
offending instrument.
A typical illustration, reproduced in
one of the leading American law school
casebooks, is the decision of Sir Jocelyn
Simon inRe Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R.
733 (Ct. Ap. 1968). Each of the two wit-
nesses, who were attending a social
gathering at the testator's home, affixed
his signature while the other was in the
next room. The will was held invalid
for violation of the requirement that the
witnesses sign in the presence of one
another, although the judge forth-
rightly declared: "I am perfectly satis-
fied that the document was intended by
the deceased to be executed as his will
and that its contents represent his tes-
tamentary intentions."
Because this rule of strict compliance
with wills act formalities produces re-
sults so harsh, sympathetic courts have
been inclined to squirm. The law re-
ports bulge with a vast, hopelessly con-
tradictory case law on questions such
as whether a gesture or a grunt consti-
tuted a testator's acknowledgment of
signature. (See Annotation, 7 A.L.R. 3d
317 (1966).) Courts have thus enabled
themselves to find literal compliance in
cases that in fact show defective com-
pliance. In the leading case of Re
Hornby, [1946] P. 171, interpreting the
requirement of the English statute that
the testator's signature be "at the end"
of the will, the court concluded that a
signature in the middle of the instru-
ment was actually at the end because
the testator "thought it would be more
convenient to have his signature" in
the middle.
It is hard to predict when the equities
of particular cases will inspire particu-
lar courts to indulge in these evasions.
Hence the strict compliance rule- al-
though meant to promote certainty in
testamentation - breeds litigation on
account of the unpredictability about
when and how the courts will apply it.
The rule has achieved what is in many
respects the worst of both worlds. It
produces results of unexampled harsh-
ness when it is enforced, and it fre-
quently leads the courts to dishonesty
and caprice when it is not.
Not surprisingly, this state of affairs
has provoked discontent. Recent law
school casebooks in the field have
prodded students to ask whether the
purposes of wills acts compel the re-
sults inflicted under the rule of literal
compliance. The Uniform Probate Code
of 1969 has made a contribution toward
reducing the dimensions of the prob-
lem-at least, in those states that have
enacted it-by reducing the number
and complexity of formalities, so that
laymen have less to get wrong. Signa-
ture and attestation are still required,
but the rules about placement of signa-
ture and presence of witnesses have
been abolished.
Literature attacks
the strict
compliance rule
Finally, the rule of literal compliance
came under direct attack. Within a
period of a few months in 1974-75, lit-
erature appeared in England, Australia,
and the United States calling for the
development of a purposive standard
for evaluating defectively executed
wills.
The first article was provoked by Re
Beadle, [1974] All E.R. 493, another of
the endless series of irreconcilable
cases applying the requirement that the
signature be "at the end." The testatrix
had signed her will at the top and again
on the envelope into which she sealed
it. The court "regretfully" declared the
will invalid. The judge candidly ob-
served that there was no possibility of
anything having been altered after the
envelope had been sealed and put
away, and that there was "no doubt at
all that the paper contains what she
wanted .. "
Commenting on Re Beadle in a lead-
ing practitioners' journal, G.M. Bates of
Birmingham University juxtaposed the
case with Re Hornby and wondered
why, if a signature placed half way
down a will could satisfy the statutory
requirement, a signature at the top
could not. That sort of critique was
hardly novel, sound though it was. But
Bates went further, arguing that the
strict compliance rule itself was mis-
guided. He suggested that "if one or
more of the [wills act] formalities is not
observed, then the court should
nevertheless give effect to the true in-
tentions of the testator as expressed in
the document, in the absence of sus-
picious circumstances." ("A Case for
Intention," 124 New Law Journal 380,
382 (1974).)
Five months after Bates's article ap-
peared, the official Law Reform Com-
mittee of South Australia took up the
theme (without knowledge of the Bates
article) as an incidental topic in a report
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dealing mainly with the projected
overhaul of the state's intestacy laws.
The committee remarked that the
number of intestate estates could be re-
duced if the courts were empowered to
validate wills despite mechanical
execution defects. "It would seem to us
that in all cases where there is a techni-
cal failure to comply with the wills act,
there should be a power given to the
court or a judge to declare that the will
in question is a good and valid testa-
mentary document if he is satisfied that
the document does in fact represent the
last will and testament of the testator
.... "(Twenty-eighth Report of the Law
Reform Committee of South Australia
to the Attorney General (1974), page
10.)
There should be
a rule of
"substantial compliance"
These English and Australian devel-
opments occurred while my article in
88 Harvard Law Review 489 (1975), set-
ting forth a doctrinal basis for more dis-
cerning enforcement of the wills act,
was in press. My position was summed
up in the title: there.should be a rule of
"Substantial Compliance with the
Wills Act" that would permit the pro-
ponents of a defectively executed will
to prove that the particular defect was
harmless to the purposes of the wills
act. Drawing on a rich literature de-
voted to identifying the functions of the
Wills Act formalities, I made the fol-
lowing points:
1. The wills act is meant to assure the
implementation of the decedent's tes-
tamentary intention at a time when, by
definition, he can no longer be on hand
to express himself. The requirement of
written terms forces the testator to leave
permanent evidence of the substance of
his wishes. Signature and attestation
provide evidence of the genuineness of
the instrument, and they caution the
testator about the seriousness and final-
ity of his act. The attestation ceremony
also has a protective function: disinter-
ested observers are supposed to prevent
crooks from deceiving or coercing the
testator into making a disposition that
does not represent his true intentions.
Taken together, these evidentiary, cau-
tionary, and protective functions serve
another end, the channeling function:
when the formalities are complied
with, they make testation routine, elim-
inate contest, reduce probate costs and
court time, and facilitate good estate
planning.
2. When, however, there has been a
mechanical blunder, it does not follow
that the purposes of the wills act have
been disserved. For example, if the
statute calls for signature "at the end"
in order to prevent subsequent interpo-
lation, it does not follow that in every
case of misplaced signature such an
event has occurred.
3. Accordingly, we could obtain all of
the benefits of the wills act formal sys-
tem and yet avoid so much of the hard-
ship if the presumption of invalidity
applied to defectively executed wills
were reduced from a conclusive to a re-
buttable one. The proponents of a de-
fectively executed will should be
allowed to prove what they are now
entitled to presume in cases of due ex-
ecution-that the will in question ex-
presses the decedent's true testamentary
intent. They should be allowed to prove
that the defect is harmless to the pur-
pose of the formality. In the example just
given of a misplaced signature, the pro-
ponents would bear the burden of prov-
ing (on an ordinary preponderance-of-
proof standard) that subsequent interpo-
lation had not occurred.
4. Although the substantial com-
pliance rule is a litigation doctrine, it
should not be feared as a potential liti-
gation breeder. Precisely because it is a
litigation rule, it would have no place
in professional estate planning. Nor
would the substantial compliance doc-
trine attract the reliance of amateurs.
Every incentive for due execution
would remain, for no testator sets out to
throw his estate into litigation.
Other factors would operate to di-
minish the incidence and the difficulty
of the litigation that would arise under
the substantial compliance rule. By no
means would every defectively exe-
cuted instrument result in a contest. On
many issues the proponents' burden of
proof would be so onerous that they
would forgo the trouble and expense of
hopeless litigation. On certain other is-
sues the proponents' burden would be
so easy to discharge that potential con-
testants would not bother to litigate.
Evidentiary and cautionary formalities
such as signature and writing are all
but indispensable, whereas omitted
protective formalities, like the simulta-
neous presence of attesting witnesses,
are easily shown to have been needless
in the particular case.
Indeed, it seems plausible that the
substantial compliance doctrine might
actually decrease the levels of probate
litigation. In numerous situations, such
as the "at-the-end" cases, the literal
compliance rule has produced a large
and contradictory case law. The courts
now purport to ask in these cases: Did
the particular conduct constitute literal
compliance with the formality? The
substantial compliance doctrine would
replace that awkward, formalistic ques-
tion with a more manageable question:
Did the conduct serve the purpose of
the formality? By substituting a purpos-
ive analysis for a formal one, the sub-
stantial compliance doctrine would
make the standard more predictable,
and contestants would lose their incen-
tive to prove harmless defects.
5. An equivalent substantial com-
pliance doctrine has been working
smoothly for decades in the func-
tionally identical sphere of the major
will substitute, life insurance, in those
situations in which there are technical
violations of the testament-like for-
malities for change-of-beneficiary des-
ignations. (See Annotation, 19 A.L.R.
2d 5 (1951).)
In November, 1975, South Australia
enacted a substantial compliance doc-
trine patterned on the recommendation
of the state law reform committee. Sec-
tion 9 of the Wills Act Amendment Act
(No. 2), which came into effect in Janu-
ary, 1976, amends the South Australian
Wills Act to provide:
"A document purporting to embody
the testamentary intentions of a de-
ceased person shall, notwithstanding
that it has not been executed with the
formalities required by this Act, be
deemed to be a will of the deceased
person if the Supreme Court [which is
the first instance court], upon applica-
tion for admission of the document to
probate as the last will of the deceased,
is satisfied that there can be no reason-
able doubt that the deceased intended
the document to constitute his will."
Courts should take
a fresh look at
substantial compliance
By enacting this extremely liberal
provision, the South Australian Par-
liament determined to put to the test of
actual experience all the hoary justifi-
cations for the rule of strict compliance.
Experience rather than conjecture
would now decide whether the strict
compliance rule had been an essential
bulwark against legions of schemers
ready to coerce and defraud enfeebled
testators; experience would now dis-
close whether decedents' estates would
be engulfed in floodtides of litigation.
Now that the proverbial floodgates
have been left open for three years, only
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a single case has arisen under the new
law, Re Graham, decided on November
29, 1978, and not yet published in the
reports. (Action No. T.C.J. 38/78, Judg-
ment No. 4090 of the Supreme Court of
South Australia, per Jacobs, J.) Ac-
cordingly, the first important lesson of
the South Australian experiment ap-
pears to be-as proponents of the sub-
stantial compliance doctrine predicted
- that the probate process functions
well without the strict compliance rule.
Future caseloads may mount as poten-
tial schemers and contestants explore
their new license, but the experience to
date certainly is to the contrary.
The opinion in Graham gives further
cause for confidence that the courts
will not find it difficult to strike the
right balance between flexible treat-
ment of formal defects, on the one
hand, and the need for strong evidence
of testamentary intent, on the other.
The facts of the case may be easily
stated. An elderly testatrix handed her
will to her nephew with her signature
already in place and asked him "to get
it witnessed." He then took it to two
neighboring housewives, who signed
as "witnesses," although neither had
actually seen the testatrix sign, as the
Wills Act requires. The nephew then
returned the will to the testatrix. In the
subsequent probate proceedings on the
defectively executed instrument, the
testatrix's signature was independently
verified.
The judge concluded, "I have not the
slightest doubt that the deceased in-
fended the document which is before
me to constitute her will." Although
not wishing to lay down broad dictum
about the new statutory substantial
compliance doctrine, the court empha-
sized the statute's "requirement that
the court should be 'satisfied that there
can be no reasonable doubt that the de-
ceased intended the document to con-
stitute his will.'" (Emphasis in the orig-
inal.) The court then remarked "that in
most cases, the greater the departure
from the requirements of formal va-
lidity dictated by" the Wills Act, "the
harder will it be for the court to reach
the desired state of satisfaction." This
reading of the statutory language is
very close to the burden-shifting rule
that was envisaged in the scholarly lit-
erature preceding the South Australian
statute, in which it had been urged that
the proponents of the will should bear
the burden of proving that the particu-
lar execution defect is harmless to the
purposes of the Wills Act.
The South Australian experience is
likely to put to rest any remaining
doubts about the wisdom of the substan-
tial compliance approach. The large
issue still unresolved is whether in
states whose legislatures have not taken
up the question the courts should be free
to adopt the substantial compliance so-
lution without statute.
It is conceded on all sides that a legis-
lature could forbid substantial com-
pliance and insist on a literal com-
pliance rule. I take the position that the
existing literal compliance rule is a ju-
dicial creation and that the courts can
abandon it when experience and reflec-
tion reveal that its harsh results are not
essential to the good order of the pro-
bate system. The substantial com-
pliance doctrine would do little more
than bring wills acts into parity with
the Statute of Frauds, in which the ju-
dicially developed part performance
and main purpose rules apply a func-
tional standard to the formalities for
contract and conveyance.
Particularly in those American juris-
dictions where the legislatures have
authorized holographic wills, it seems
appropriate to ask courts to take a fresh
look at the substantial compliance
question. The legislatures in these
states have authorized in the holograph
a type of testation that completely dis-
penses with the protective policy that is
the dominant concern of so many of the
formalities for attested wills. When,
therefore, a testator attempts to make an
attested will but blunders, he will still
have achieved a level of formality that
compares favorably with that permitted
for a holographic will in the same state.
In an age when the expansive re-
quirements of public law tend ever
more to crowd private law matters from
the legislative agenda, it is unrealistic
to pretend that the legislatures should
correct the courts' mistake in the in-
terpretation of the wills act. Substantial
compliance is the proper work of the
courts, and it is also the new responsi-
bility and opportunity of the probate
bar to raise the issue on behalf of the
intended beneficiaries of blemished
wills. A
(John H. Langbein is a professor of
law at the University of Chicago. He
will be chairman of a panel on recent
Australian developments at the Ameri-
can Bar Association 1980 annual meet-
ing in Australia. The panel will be
sponsored by the Section of Real Prop-
erty, Probate, and Trust Law.)
August, 1979 * Volume 65 1195
Vk,
El
%w York, N.Y
"The Action between His Majesty's Ship Serapis, Commanded by Captain Pearson, and the Bon Homme
Richard, Commanded by Paul Jones." Painting by Lt. Wm. Elliott, R.N., 1789. Oil on canvas, 44' x 67',
(Courtesy United States Naval Academy Museum.)
